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How to theorize the subject of play? The modern field of game studies knows two paradoxical 
ontologies of the subject of the player. One tradition regards the ‘rehearsal’ of subject 
positions within ludic structures as a construction of Althusserian interpellated subjects (Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009). Another tradition regards players as principially demystifying 
(Friedman, 1995) or deconstructing agents (Raessens, 2011) that, through playing, dismantle 
the game along with any seductive ideology or bias. 
 My presentation works through this paradox with the aid of Miguel Sicart’s ‘skin-
subject,’ and Michel Foucault’s concept of governance in order to provide a model of the 
subject of play as one necessarily split between the played, playing and player-subject. Firstly, 
philosopher and game scholar Miguel Sicart proposes a perspective on games as spaces of 
morality in which the player can be present. This presence of the player does not fully 
correlate with the player as moral subject, but is rather a “skin-subject in contact with the 
world outside the game, which in return does have influence over how a player experiences a 
certain game” (2009, 102). Already, we may distinguish in this skin-subject the played entity 
of the avatar among the other presented content of the game; and distinguish it from the 
person outside of the game. As a case study, Galactic Café’s The Stanley Parable (2007, 
2013) proves a case in point: the game takes a lot of effort to rhetorically differentiate these 
distinct subjects within the context of the game. 
 Such a playing, or controlling entity is often lauded as essentially autonomous, due to 
the freedom granted by interactive media. Already in the early 21st century this concept of 
‘interactivity’ was problematized (cf. Aarseth, 1997; Raessens, 2005). Indeed, player 
behaviour is to a large extent meaningful only in that it is necessitated through the game’s 
ruleset and possible world: its presented affordances, constraints and goals amount to what is 
commonly called a ludic contract (Pratt, 2010) or lusory attitude (Suits, 1978, 35), a certain 
surrender to the fiction and goals of the game. The mechanism by which ludic structures 
function as governing structures is akin to a Foucaultian model of power relations. Much like 
the way in which power structures are prerequisites for the subject, a ludic structure provides 
a pre-requisite for the voluntarily subjectification of the playing-subject. 
 A final reason to further differentiate the subject of play is that the playing-subject is 
inevitably separate from the player-subject: the ludoliterate player behind the interface. The 
case study of Yager Development’s Spec Ops: the Line (2012) shows that it is necessary to 
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distinguish the playing-subject’s actions as necessitated by a ludic contract (until broken); and 
the player (or interpreting) subject as a classical reader capable of reflection. A reading of 
Spec Ops will reveal the distance between the split subjectivities of the subject of play as one 
that is both necessary and generative of meaning. This constellation – akin to narratological 
accounts of literature as spear-headed by Genette and, specifically, Mieke Bal (1985) – 
provides a methodology to adequately theorize the subjecthood of the player and their 
freedom within a ludic structure. Additionally, it provides a method to engage in close-
readings of digital games such as Spec Ops: the Line and their possibilities of engaging in 
critical reflection through mechanics of Brechtian Verfremdung. 
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Introduction 
 “ I don’t understand. How on earth are you making meaningful choices? What did you—
–wait a second. Did I just see, no that’s not possible. I can’t believe it. How had I not 
noticed it sooner? You’re not Stanley. You’re a real person!” 
– Narrator (The Stanley Parable, Galactic Café, 2013) 
 
When the narrator of The Stanley Parable realizes that the plot he was laboriously narrating 
was all this time acted out by a human player behind a computer, he is suitably astonished. 
After all, digital games may depend on an audience able to act – but that player’s actions are 
still limited by script. Why, then, can it seem even remotely astonishing that The Stanley 
Parable reflects on this lack of freedom? I propose that this is because of a fundamental 
tension in participatory media that games often wilfully ignore: while the promise of 
interactivity may be a promise of freedom, even the briefest contemplation shows us that the 
explorable options making up this freedom are limited and, perhaps more disillusioning, pre-
programmed. Yet, grammatically speaking, games seem to be particularly first-person 
experiences. I might take pride in completing America’s Army’s basic training (United States 
Army 2002), or gravely remember the moment I walked Martin Walker, in slow-motion, 
through desert dunes filled with hundreds of still-burning bodies in Spec Ops: the Line after a 
white phosphorus attack (Yager Development 2012). But who is that I, and to what extent can 
I be, at once, the person playing a game as well as being Martin Walker, traversing the Dubai 
desert? How is this subject split and how do these subjectivities relate? In order to define the I 
of the digital game-playing-subject, I ask: 
What type of subject is constructed through the structures of digital game-play? 
I will start by reiterating two traditions through which the gaming subject has frequently been 
theorized: an interpellationary and a deconstructivist model. Second, I will look at Miguel 
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Sicart’s attempt at bridging these two positions by describing a player-subject in a Foucaultian 
model of power relations that articulates how the game-as-structure brings into being a 
specific player-subject. I will, however, problematize Sicart’s concept of the ‘player-subject’ 
as a unified, stable subject separate from the ‘playing’ self. My case study will serve partly as 
a counter-example, as The Stanley Parable thematizes reflection to address the difference 
between the playing-subject and the avatar through which the player is present within the 
diegesis of the game. Departing from Sicart’s player-subject I will re-define the split subject 
of digital game-play on the basis of Ernst van Alphen’s ideological subject in language. 
There, I turn to Spec Ops’ interplay between game and player in order to indicate the critical 
potential of digital game-play by enstranging its subjects. 
 
Interpellation versus Deconstruction 
Writing in 1995, media scholar Ted Friedman is early to recognize a tendency among critics 
to understand the limitations of choice in digital games as paradigmatic for ideology. Even in 
the case of freely explorable environments and branching choices, “a hypertext model of 
‘interactive cinema’ still does little to give the player a sense of real autonomy,” indeed “the 
choices remain a limited set of pre-defined options” (1995: 79). The problem is not so much 
that we should expect games to be ‘objective’ or ‘free from bias’ as Friedman puts it – after 
all, “computer programs, like all texts, will always be ideological constructions” (81). The 
fear of those other critics is rather that the illusion of freedom promised by interactivity serves 
to veil the ideology of the program.  
While Friedman cites columnist Jerry Pournelle, many other authors have followed 
comparable lines of reasoning. Media scholar Eggo Müller exemplifies this reasoning – while 
not, eventually, endorsing it – by summarizing it as such: 
…whereas the 'passive' viewer has the freedom to negotiate or resist the 
ideology of a program (as described in active audience theory), the interactive 
participant necessarily affirms the program's ideological stance. (Müller 2009: 
53) 
By going along with the proposed behaviour of the system, by following the rules of the 
game, the naive player-subject necessarily follows the system’s proposed world view, or so 
the argument goes. Marxist academics Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter go so far as 
to say that interactivity “[rather] intensifies the sense of free will necessary for ideology to 
work really well. Players, of their own choice, rehearse socially stipulated subjectivities” 
(2009: 192). 
We may recognize, in this line of reasoning, a presumed merger of the player and the diegetic 
character into a single, stable subject. Completely caught up in the illusion of agency, players 
lose themselves in the game-proposed roles as “consumer, commander, commanded, cyborg, 
criminal” and other such “subject positions” (ibid.). The process of this identification is 
theorized by Dyer-Witheford through Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser’s concept of 
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interpellation. The process of interpellation, as coined in Althusser’s 1969 essay “Idéologie et 
Appareils Idéologiques d'Etat” entails that ideological practice constitutes individuals as 
subjects (696) through a social practice of being ‘hailed’ or interpellated into specific subject 
positions (699). By being hailed as, say, a father, a hard-working labourer or a lawyer, we 
acquire our identities through ideology. An ideology that, additionally, has a material 
existence (695) in that the ‘ideas’ of a human subject exist in his actions (695-96). Any 
individual or collective idea of who we are is, according to Althusser’s theoretical framework, 
a consequence of adopting, through material practice – in this case playing a digital game – 
“the subject position proposed for us by [societal] discourse” (Fiske 1987: 53). 
The reasoning is certainly appealing, but it is problematized by various factors. First – as 
mentioned above – it assumes a ‘naive’ player that is completely caught up in the illusion of 
the fictional role. In other words, the presumed merger of player and character disregards a 
cynical engagement with the game: aware of the propagandist agenda behind recruitment 
game America’s Army, I am perfectly able to play for fun without being truly hailed as 
(American) soldier. Second, the type of “feedback loop between user and computer” that 
Friedman also recognized (1995: 73) is problematized by what media scholar Diane Carr 
recognizes as the dynamicity of digital games: 
...if interpellation does happen during play, there is no reason to assume that 
the potential interpellations posed by these various systems would be 
cumulative. It seems just as likely that they might clash, or that they would be 
mutually affirming one moment but contradictory the next. For this reason an 
account of ideology in games that relied on a static model of interpellation 
would be unsatisfactory. (Carr: 2007) 
Similarly, Carr suggests the subject position offered to the player-subject to be dynamic, 
“activated or dormant, taken up, dropped or ignored by a player from moment to moment,” a 
position that fundamentally clashes with Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter’s assumption of the 
stable, ready-made roles that digital games offer for us to adopt.  
We encounter a final problem to an interpellational model of digital play when returning to 
Friedman, who suggests that “the process of computer game playing” is exactly a revealing of 
“the inner relationships” of the simulation (1995: 82). In other words, “learning and winning 
[…] a computer game is a process of demystification: one succeeds by discovering how the 
software is put together” (ibid.). We find this school of thought continued in the work of 
psychologist Sherry Turkle (acknowledging the possibility for “simulation understanding,” or, 
alternatively, “resignation” to and “rejection” of its underlying assumptions [1996: 71]); Ian 
Bogost (coining ‘procedural literacy’ as a similar process of recognizing the rhetorical 
gestures of simulations’ processes [2007: 258]); and, notably, play scholar Joost Raessens, 
who aligns Friedman’s demystification and similar processes of recognizing digital games’ 
assumptions with the method of déconstruction:  
...the method of interpretation that aims to bring to the foreground those 
elements that operate under the surface, but break through cracks in the text to 
disrupt its superficial functioning. (Raessens 2005: 376) 
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While, on one hand, then, an interpellational model of gameplay assumes that players are 
‘hailed’ completely into the subject position offered by immersive games; a deconstructivist 
model proposes that players are wholly detached critics that deconstruct games’ systems as a 
quintessential way of engaging with and understanding them. As with every simplification of 
academic debate, these positions are necessarily exaggerated,
1
 but I take them to be 
representative of two wholly alternative ways of theorizing the player-subject that make far-
reaching assumptions about the distinction between players and the fictional worlds they 
interact with. 
 
Games as Foucaultian Power Structures 
The point of friction between these two models is their choice of emphasis. The 
interpellational model assumes the ideological-paradigmatic role of an ideal player, subsumed 
under the game as a ludic structure, and emphasizes this governing structure as one guiding 
the player uncritically through a finite number of pre-programmed choices. The 
deconstructivist model emphasizes, instead, a detached player-subject, unearthing the game’s 
underlying rules as an object of analysis in order to interact with those rules (i.e. to play) 
successfully. 
Rather than being mutually exclusive, the ideological-paradigmatic game-as-structure and the 
deconstructing player-as-subject are in a dialectical relationship, producing what Miguel 
Sicart terms the ‘player-subject’ within the game. Sicart argues that it is the relation between 
game and player that produces the player-subject. He connects the game-as-object – as set of 
rules – to the player-subject by viewing the former as a power structure in a Foucaultian 
sense. Much like the way in which power structures are prerequisites for the subject, he 
argues, “the game as an object is a prerequisite for the being of the player” (Sicart 2009: 67). 
Sicart’s player-subject is characterized by two properties which I will treat below. First, as 
mentioned, Sicart’s player-subject is produced in a process of voluntary subjectivization akin 
to Foucaultian power structures. This theoretical framework addresses the relationship 
between the game-as-structure and the player-subject, as well as providing a productive way 
of thinking the phenomenology of digital play as adopting and experiencing a temporary 
subjectivity. A second property of Sicart’s player-subject is its status as a ‘skin-subject,’ 
whose relationship is unclear to other subjectivities – specifically to subjecthood outside of 
the game.  
“Playing a computer game,” for Sicart, “is an act of subjectivization, a process that creates a 
subject connected to the rules of the game” (63). He uses the term subject in both Michel 
                                                 
1
 We need only look at the caricatural positions used to describe the narratology-ludology debate, or the more 
recent procedurality-playcentrism debate: in the end it proves near impossible to point to any scholars wholly 
identified with one of these poles (cf. Frasca 2003; Lederle-Ensign 2013). In the case of my ‘deconstructivist’ 
model, for example, Raessens nuances Friedman’s absolute characterization of gameplay as demystifying by 
suggesting that a large number of players may be perfectly content “staying at the surface of the fiction [...] as 
opposed to the previous in-depth deconstruction” (Raessens 2005: 378). 
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Foucault’s meanings of the word: as “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and 
tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault 2001: 331). How does 
this subjectivization process work in the context of digital games? 
Once a player figures out the rules of a game, they know what their “actions in the game were 
supposed to be,” allowing them to act on that knowledge (Sicart 2009: 65). That is: playing 
involves acknowledging and obeying its rules. Sicart consequently argues “that when a player 
is immersed in this system, her behaviour is shaped by the game system, its rules and 
mechanics” (66). Inferred knowledge on that system produces the power relation that 
generates the subject’s behaviour. This approach differs from the interpellational model above 
only in that the relation of the diegetic player-subject (while still undifferentiated from the 
played character) to the player as “a cultural and moral being” outside of the game is 
voluntary (63). Player-subjects evolve as test-cases: possibilities for players to perform other 
subjectivities. 
Two reasons why Sicart uses Foucault in order to provide a framework to describe the relation 
between the player and the game are, first, that power and power structures for Foucault are 
not necessarily subject to negative or positive value statements, they merely exist; and, 
second, that “power structures are prerequisites for the subject” (67). For Foucault, power 
structures are enacted not so much in “such-or-such institution of power, or group, or elite, or 
class:” it is rather a technique or form (2001: 331). This “form of power […] categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity,” making the 
individual into a subject (ibid.).  
In “the Subject and Power,” Foucault foregrounds the question of ‘how’ power is exercised in 
order to de-emphasize “questions of ‘what’ and ‘why’” (337). Power “brings into play 
relations between individuals,” and it is in these power relations (“and not power itself” 
[339]) that subjects are acted upon. Instead of “global, massive or diffused” power as entity, it 
is something exercised (put into action) on another: a power relation can only be articulated 
on the basis of an ‘other’ “recognized and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts” 
(340).  
In the case of a player maintained as a subject capable of action within the set of rules offered 
up by the game, that power relation rests on the instrument of consent. On the basis of this 
instrumental role of consent, Sicart argues for the necessity of recognizing the voluntary 
nature of player-subjectivity  – indeed, “the exercise of power can never do without [violence 
or consent], often both at the same time” (Foucault 2001: 340-41). I would like to additionally 
draw attention to Foucault’s use of the words ‘conduct’ (playing on (se) conduire, to 
lead/drive; as well as to conduct oneself, to behave) and ‘government,’ in the way that a 
political structure can govern as well as in the way “in which the conduct of individuals or of 
groups might be directed” (341). A way to envision how games can function as rulesets 
generative of subjects is by thinking of them as governing or conducting those player-
subjects, which “is to structure the possible field of action of others” (ibid.). Rather than 
violence (which I consider irrelevant to most cases of digital play) or voluntary contracts 
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(which Sicart takes as defining in the case of digital play [2009: 68]), it is government that 
Foucault considers “the relationship proper to power” (Foucault 2001: 341).  
As a type of freely adopted governing institution, then, the power structure of a game’s rules 
‘produces’ a player-subject: “the game’s ontological nature initially defines the ontological 
position of its subjects, the players, [in that it] establishes the starting point for the process of 
subjectivization that takes place in the act of playing a game” (Sicart 2009: 68). The 
‘ontological nature’ of a game is, for Sicart “as a system of rules that create and are 
experienced through game worlds” (47). Yet how does a system of rules produce a subject 
and define its initial ontological position? 
Sicart approaches games as events akin to Badiou’s événement: “an act of absolute truth that 
shatters the established knowledge” and, additionally, “an experience of delimited boundaries 
with a series of imperatives that have to be assumed in order to become a subject” (Sicart 
2009: 71). Thus, “faithful to those principles [the series of imperatives], the player as subject 
is created” (71). To Sicart, this eclectic combination of Badiou and Foucault shapes a player-
subject that is necessarily faithful to the game’s experience. As such, “games as objects can 
condition what the ethical practices and values of the players will be through their affordances 
and constraints” (102). 
There are some problems with this process. The player-subject for Sicart is generated in a 
power structure, created as “a subset of our being as multiple subject” (73). But this 
subjecthood, particular to each game, assumes a faithfulness to the governing principles in 
order to be. It ends when the player stops playing or does not abide to the principles of play – 
in Sicart’s terms, when it does not show fidelity to the game’s “affordances and constraints” 
(102). In fact, “not being faithful to the rules implies not being faithful to the event, and 
therefore losing the ontological status of subject” for Sicart (71). In his example, to stop 
playing a game like Custer’s Revenge (Mystique 1982), which features rape as its primary 
goal, is to “immediately suspend the player-subjectivity” and revert to one’s “own personal 
and cultural values” (103, emphasis added). The example is one that rejects a moral 
perversion: the player-subject, which we might remember as a subset of “our being as 
multiple subject” (73), is rejected by “[the] cultural and moral being” (63) of which it is a 
subset. There is, for Sicart, an implicit super-subject: one’s ‘own’ subject as an autonomous 
individual playing the game – made up of a set of personal and cultural values – that is, to 
Sicart, outside of the push and pull of power relations. 
Granted, there is a certain porosity between Sicart’s player-subject, generated by the power 
structure of the game, and the cultural and moral being of which it is a subset, but it is a one-
way exchange. The subject that is playing the game informs the player-subject, in order to 
better “deduce the rules” of the structure players are subjects of (69). Elsewhere, Sicart 
redefines the “larger cultural being” of which the “player-subject is only a subset” as an agent 
“bringing [experience] into the game” (77). Their relation is further ill-defined: the player-
subject is merely a “skin-subject in contact with the world outside the game, which in return 
does have influence over how a player experiences a certain game” (102).  
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Sicart uses the metaphor of the skin for the player-subject as a temporarily adopted virtual 
skin “that is both ‘oneself’ and ‘other,’ because it has a component of strangeness that puts the 
player in contact with the virtual world” (78). As such, playing becomes “putting on the 
player-skin and experiencing the world and the game world within it” (79). The metaphor of 
the skin “connects the internal, individual subjectivity of the player with the larger 
communitarian, cultural and historical subjectivities of the contemporary self” (ibid.).  
What Sicart leaves us with is a relation between the game-as-structure and the player-as-
subject wherein the game’s formal set of rules governs the behaviour and ontology of a 
‘player-subject’ through a process similar to Foucault’s power relations. That concept of the 
player-subject is, however, unclearly based on the experience of immersion, an experience 
that is furthermore ill-defined in its relation to the player as a subject outside of the game – 
sometimes as another “subset of our being as multiple subject” (73), other times as a “larger 
cultural being” (77). 
 
Stanley Decides for Himself Now 
I would like to turn now, briefly, to subjecthood in The Stanley Parable as it thematically 
foregrounds governance: the character Stanley is introduced as someone guided by orders, 
pushing buttons in servitude, and the player is ostensibly expected to do the same. Stanley 
epitomizes the first sense of Foucault’s subject as someone “subject to someone else by 
control and dependence” (2001, 331), following each order, experiencing dread when the 
power relationship is suspended. Whereas before, “Stanley relished every moment that the 
orders came in, as though he had been made exactly for this job,” suddenly “something very 
peculiar happened. Something that would forever change Stanley” (Galactic Café, 2013):  
He had been at his desk for nearly an hour when he realized that not one single 
order had arrived on the monitor for him to follow. No-one had shown up to 
give him instructions […] Something was very clearly wrong. Shocked, frozen 
solid, Stanley found himself unable to move for the longest time. But as he 
came to his wits and regained his senses, he got up from his desk and stepped 
out of his office. (ibid.) 
At this point, the fictional subject Stanley ends, and the disembodied representation of Stanley 
– seen as an other, represented in a there-and-then the way we see actors in film – turns into 
an embodied presentation: we take Stanley’s perspective and control him in the here-and-now. 
As those last words of narration are heard (“he got up from his desk and stepped out of his 
office”), we have little choice but to follow those orders ourselves – that is, to subject 
ourselves to the same power relationship with the narration (as an aspect of the game’s 
design) that Stanley was in. When I say “we have little choice” that means we have some 
choices: we may choose to stand around in office 427 and possibly look around; we may 
choose to quit the game; or we may choose to follow the narration. 
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Figure 1. Third person (The Stanley Parable, Galactic Café 2013) 
Quitting the game at this point, refusing to play, suspends the ‘player-subject’ of the The 
Stanley Parable. Refusing what philosopher Bernard Suits calls the “lusory attitude,” the 
playful attitude to submit to “games [as] rule-governed activities,” means that “it is not 
possible to play a game” (1978: 35). Alternatively, the term ludic contract is employed as an 
agreement, similar to Suits’ lusory attitude, “on the part of players that they will forgo some 
of their agency in order to experience an activity that they enjoy;” which is, according to 
game design scholar Charles J. Pratt, a case of “adopting an ideology more than a set of 
abstract rules” (2010). Pratt’s example is that of Bioshock (2K Games, 2007), whose ludic 
contract Clint Hocking describes as “seek power and you will progress” (2007, 256). To 
refuse that ideology is to refuse the ludic contract, is not to play. In other words, not playing 
means refusing the ‘initial ontological position’ of the ‘player-subject’ for Sicart (2009: 69).  
If we do allow the player-subject to be created by submitting to the rules of the game, The 
Stanley Parable’s branching narrative forces us to acknowledge a difference between the 
‘skin’ we are adopting (i.e. that of Stanley) and ourselves as controllers of that skin. This 
problematizes Sicart’s skin-subject as entirely subsumed under the ‘multiple subject’ of the 
player: characters like Stanley have a determinate background story, a gender, a visual 
representation and so on. Even in a game such as the Parable where all the choices are made 
by a player who does not relinquish this control (as we will see in Spec Ops: the Line, and can 
acknowledge in any game employing cinematic cut scenes), there is a split between the 
character played and the subject playing. The Stanley Parable plays on this, for example when 
suggesting the player quit the game in order to save Stanley from dying in a large crushing 
machine; or when acknowledging, as cited in the introductory citation, that Stanley is 
someone fundamentally different from the player, but instead “a real person” (2013). This 
rhetoric is underlined visually under certain conditions, when another ending has been 
completed first. Reaching the area with the two doors again, the player will ‘leave’ Stanley 
both in terms of control and of perspective – leaving him ungoverned and motionless (Figure 
1). As the credits roll, the narrator worries about Stanley’s inability to act, unable to decide for 
himself.  
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The Split Subject 
A subject generated through digital play, then, is a subject partly created in the power 
structure of a game’s world. It is, furthermore, a subject with a variable but distinguishable 
relation to the subject depicted in the game. Both of these, additionally, should be 
distinguished from a ludoliterate subject outside of the game. As a whole we may recognize 
and distinguish the subject behind the computer (what the Stanley Parable’s narrator called “a 
real person”); a subject present and acting within the game under its lusory attitude; and a 
subject that is controlled and has its own representation (e.g. Stanley). 
I argue for a recognition of this player-subject as the split subject of the external player or 
‘interpreting-subject’ behind the computer; the ‘playing-subject’ in a mediated presence of the 
game; and the ‘played-subject’ or ‘interpreted-subject’ which we control, to which we 
relinquish control at the whim of narrative. 
I base these subject positions within the multi-subject of the player on Ernst van Alphen’s 
analytical distinction between three ideological-linguistic subjects. Van Alphen introduces the 
interpreting-, speaking- and interpreted-subject (1987: 28). The interpreting-subject 
‘interprets’ in the sense that “it constrains the possible significations” of a text – the reader, 
or, within a text and within narratology, the focalizer, or the instance whose position readers 
align themselves with (28-29).
2
 The speaking subject is a “spokesman of a text, the implicit or 
explicit ‘I’ that expresses [its] signs” (ibid.)3 – the narrator in literature or cinema. The 
interpreted-subject can be the theme, the subject of the text in the sense of its topic, or a 
character (29).
4
 Cultural theorist Mieke Bal, whose terminology van Alphen bases himself on, 
differentiates in her Narratology (1985) between the “abstract actor and the more specific 
term character,” where the latter is rather an anthropomorphic figure: “more often than not a 
character resembles a human being and an actor need not necessarily do so” (114). I will leave 
this specification aside for now, rather moving on to an elaboration of these three subjects: the 
interpreting, speaking and interpreted-subjects of van Alphen. 
The interpreting-subject of ideology for van Alphen can be located in a reader or decoder the 
external aspect of the text or communicative situation that constrains the possibilities of 
signification (55).
5
 When stating that the interpreting-subject in the case of the digital player 
constrains the possible significations of a text, through conventions, the knowledge thereof is 
akin to a ‘ludoliteracy,’ a familiarity with the coded conventions of (digital) play (cf. Zagal 
2010: 23). Based on the knowledge of these conventions, playful situations are understood in 
the same sense that texts are understood: through knowledge of earlier play. The interpreting-
subject’s knowledge of other games necessarily informs the playing-subject in order to 
                                                 
2
 “Het interpreterend subject is die instantie die de mogelijke betekenissen inperkt. In de verteltheorie wordt dit 
aspect de focalisator genoemd (Bal 1985). Dit is de instantie door wiens ogen we als lezer meekijken” (van 
Alphen 1987: 28-29). 
3
 “de woordvoerder van een tekst, de impliciete of expliciete ‘ik’ die de tekens uit”  (van Alphen 1987: 28). 
4
 “Het geïnterpreteerde subject kan het thema, het onderwerp van de tekst maar ook een personage zijn” (van 
Alphen 1987: 29). 
5
 “het interpreterend subject [is] dat aspect van de tekst of van de communicatiesituatie dat de vele 
betekenismogelijkheden inperkt” (van Alphen 1987: 55). 
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recognize such conventions as health bars, genres and so on. As Sicart relates: “as a cultural 
being that has been playing games since a very early age I have developed a repertoire that 
allows me to identify patterns of rules and apply them” in order to understand “what my 
actions in the game” as a playing-subject “were supposed to be” (2009: 65). 
As for the playing-subject, it is problematic to apply the speaking subject or narrator directly 
to either the game-as-structure, or the choices made by the players within that structure. 
Within the rules, the playing-subject ‘speaks’. In other words: the playing-subject is the 
implicit I that produces the signs of an ergodic text,
6
 causing the expression of game’s code – 
here, in the concrete sense of programming and as the coded conventions to be (re-
)interpreted by the interpreting-subject. There is, then, already a dialectic emerging between 
them: the ludoliterate interpreting-subject reads the codes of the game, informing the choices 
as a playing-subject, thus actualizing the game through play. In turn, those choices change the 
state of the game, leading to a re-interpretation, a further actualization and so on. The function 
of speaking (or expression) in the case of digital games is shared by the playing-subject (of 
the multi-subject of myself as a player) and the game’s governing structure in a two-step 
actualization. Insofar as interpretation is only possible after expression, the playing-subject 
and the auctorial organization are at the basis of digital game-play’s speaking subject – 
presenting the codes for interpretation. Only through interaction of the playing-subject 
speaking with the code does game-play come to expression – using the term interaction not as 
‘participation’ by the player (Raessens 2005: 379-380), but exactly in the sense of inter- 
(between, among) and āctiō (acting, speaking, conducting): speaking or action between each 
other [“inter-” and “action,” OED Online 2014]). 
The interpreted-subject, for van Alphen, is equivalent to the socially constructed meaning of a 
text (1987: 57), which I take to be as constructed or understood by the interpreting-subject 
through the conventions known by the interpreting-subject.
7
 In one instance, van Alphen 
gives characters within the text (in the shape of represented, fictional, subjects) as a type of 
interpreted-subject within linguistic structures (29); another example is that of the subject 
matter of the text, its ‘theme,’ ‘substance,’ meaning or signification (58).8 The state of this 
subject is ambiguous, even for van Alphen: it can only be called a subject in a vision of 
semiosis that takes the text as the origin of meaning as opposed to the result of meaning (in a 
more Barthesian sense). Alternatively, then, the interpreted-subject is rather an object (29): 
the presented content offered by the auctorial organization of the game.  
I choose, rather, to make the distinction of the interpreted-subject as the fictional subject 
represented in the game, which is malleable and controllable by the playing-subject but 
nonetheless designed and essentially unchangeable. This played-subject is that of the avatar 
                                                 
6
 An ergodic text is one that requires “non-trivial effort […] to traverse the text,” a neologism from ergon (work) 
and hodos (path) (Aarseth, 1997, 1). That is to say, the playing subject exerts non-trivial effort on interactive 
texts, digital games and so on by navigating its possible world in the broadest sense – for the sake of comparison: 
the trivial effort of a ‘nonergodic’ text is flipping pages, moving eyes across a page and so on (Aarseth, 1997, 1-
2). 
7
 “ De sociale betekenis […] van een tekst is nu het ‘ geïnterpreteerde subject’  zoals dat door de toepassing van 
al dan niet ideologische codes tot stand gekomen is” (van Alphen 1987: 57). 
8
 My translation of “het onderwerp van de tekst, zijn ‘thema’, ‘stof’ of ‘betekenis’ (van Alphen 1987: 58). 
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representing a character (Lara Croft, Nathan Drake, Martin Walker); the avatar and camera of 
third-person configurations whom we lose control over – who acts, in other words, as a 
cinematic subject or visual narrator: not interpreting, not playing, but to be played and 
interpreted. 
Based on the above, I recognize the player-subject as syntactically split between the I of the 
interpreting-subject, behind the computer or the interface, which constrains the possible 
significations of a text and informs the playing-subject based on knowledge of ludic 
conventions. The playing-subject is the implicit I that produces the signs of an ergodic text 
within the possibility space of the governing game-as-structure. The played (interpreted) 
subject is the represented subject, the ‘skin-subject’ in Sicart: the objective avatar through 
which the playing-subject is present. Yet the avatar in itself is a character, a represented object 
to be interpreted. Below, I shall untangle these separately in the case of Spec Ops: the Line’s 
specific configuration of subjects. As I will argue, the game structurally frustrates attempts to 
unify these subjects, instead enstranging them from each other.  
 
Me/Playing/Walker 
The narrator of The Stanley Parable was shocked upon learning that the interpreting-subject is 
a ‘real person:’ someone behind a computer, entirely distinct from the character Stanley. I 
recognized, there, a fundamental tension between the playing-subject and the played-subject 
experienced as different entities: I am merely controlling Stanley while I am playing the 
game. Spec Ops: the Line engages with this same paradox by presenting the player with a 
strong, identifiable lead character, but enstranging the playing-subject from this played-
subject, Martin Walker. This, in turn, confronts the interpreting-subject with the playing-
subject’s compliance to ludic conventions. 
I will argue, below, that Spec Ops the Line depends on a sufficiently literate interpreting-
subject, while demanding (through its constraints and affordances) the playing-subject to 
follow the global-political genre conventions of the third person shooter. A ludonarrative 
dissonance is created by demanding the playing-subject to kill for selfish reasons and to use 
unethical means of military intervention, while the game’s played-subject reflects on the ludic 
actions of the playing-subject.
9
 While the playing-subject follows the orders of its ludic 
structure, a schizophrenic situation is created: the interpreting-subject is enstranged from the 
actions on the screen, inciting criticism or the desire to quit the ludic contract. 
Yager Development’s Spec Ops: the Line (2012) is, ostensibly, the most generic shooter 
imaginable. Everything about it is set up to conform to the conventions of block-buster 
shooting games: its cinematic opening scene in medias res (a helicopter dog fight over a 
ruined Dubai); its semi-first person configuration (oscillating between point-of-view and 
over-the-shoulder shooting as in blockbusters Gears of War [Epic Games 2006] and 
                                                 
9
 Game designer Clint Hocking coined the term to describe the effect of “throwing the narrative and ludic 
elements of the work [a game] into opposition” (2007, 256). More colloquially: the ‘story’ of a game asks the 
player to do something that does not fit, or contradicts, its possible or required behaviour. 
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Uncharted); its setting of American foreign military intervention (as in Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare 2 [Infinity Ward 2009]; America’s Army); even its main character’s voice actor 
Nolan North (as in the Uncharted series, Assassin’s Creed series and many games in the Call 
of Duty series). As one blogger has pointedly stated: “Spec Ops occurs in the ruins of Dubai. 
There is a desert. There are people to shoot. So anybody who has played an FPS should feel 
right at home” (Calhoun 2014).  
Thus, the role is perfectly familiar to the reasonably experienced player: they play Cpt. Martin 
Walker who sets out to rescue Col. John Konrad in a narrative similar to Joseph Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness (1899): Konrad has defected and set up an autonomous anarchic commune 
amidst an orientalised, fearsome Dubai swept by sandstorms. Yet, as the game progresses, its 
played-subject problematizes the straightforward discourse of American exceptionalism and 
military glorification of many blockbuster series such as Gears of War or Call of Duty – in 
part through its glaring allusions to Heart of Darkness
10
 and ubiquity of Vietnam era protest 
music.
11
 That is not to say that there are not players who simply ignore its glaring allusions. 
For each reviewer, commenter or friend that lauds the game’s subversion of convention there 
is a commenter or friend that “will play the game as a generic third-person shooter and take 
away little more than that” (Keogh 2012: 4). As game scholar Brendan Keogh notes, he spent 
time repeatedly watching a YouTube video series to check his references: “the player that 
produced these videos spent much of the time trash-talking the NPCs and revelling in the 
violence with hardly a moment’s reflection” (ibid.). Important as this is to note, it is also 
perhaps all the more reason to stress the role of individual interpretation separate from the 
actions performed in play.  
The formal game design choice I will focus on is explicitly a manifestation of the distinction 
between the interpreting, playing and played-subjects. At one pivotal moment in the game, the 
played-subject Martin Walker is confronted with numerous defected American soldiers. 
Walker is unambiguously a played-subject here, acting, speaking and deciding regardless of 
any input: our presence during this cut scene is minimized to a disembodied presence through 
the visual narrator (i.e. a cinematic camera gazes upon an autonomous avatar). He, Walker, is 
here grammatically a third person. Conveniently, the game provides a solution to the uneven 
battle in the form of a mortar carrying white phosphorous bombs. One of Walker’s team 
mates protests, but Walker insists that there is no choice, which, indeed, the game’s rule-set 
enforces. That is to say, after regaining control the playing-subject has no choice but to use 
white phosphorus as the only way to progress in the game, despite the chemical’s unclear 
legal and ethical status (MacLeod and Rogers 2007) and recent controversial uses by the 
United States Army (Spinner et al. 2004).  
While a playing-subject exists within the lusory contract that demands the player progress by 
using the chemical weapon, the game does something interesting to enstrange the interpreting-
                                                 
10
 For the connection to Heart of Darkness and its cinematic adaptation Apocalypse Now (1979) see Payne 
(2014); Hamilton (2012); Brendan Keogh’s book-length close-reading of the game (2012) or Lejacq (2012), in 
which the developers confirm their intention. For a concise overview of “Spec Ops: The Line’s Conventional 
Subversion of the Military Shooter” see Keogh (2013). 
11
 I noted, among others, Jimi Hendrix, (diegetic instances of) Deep Purple and Martha and the Vandellas as well 
as present-day protest music including the Black Angels. 
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subject from the playing-subject. Firing the mortar bombs is done by first shooting a camera 
up in the air with a parachute, and then aiming the mortar strikes through a screen relaying the 
camera’s view. As the player does so, the game repeats one of its recurring tropes: the player 
sees Walker’s reflection and – in turn – their own reflection as an interpreting-subject on the 
TV screen displaying the game.
12
 
This uncovering of the split nature of the player is a schizophrenic moment to be understood 
as an ‘enstrangement’ from the actions and convictions of the playing and played-subject, or 
“one could just as well say: to make them strange [verfremden]” (Benjamin, 1939, 18, original 
emphasis). I choose the term enstrangement as a translation of Verfremdung, here, because of 
the linguistic, historical and conceptual origin of Brecht’s term in the Russian Formalists’ 
ostranenie. Again, the function of enstrangement is that one can be made re-aware of 
(cognitively) familiar circumstances – such as the heavily familiarized conventions of digital 
gaming’s war genres – and objects by presenting them in a new (or ‘strange’) fashion 
(Shklovsky, 1929, 6). Hence, a convention so familiar so as to appear natural must be 
enstranged to once more draw attention toward it – such as the social convention of, say, the 
American working class to labour for minimum wages without guarantee of health care and 
little social security; or Muslim women being subordinate to the will of their husbands and 
male kin. Or the shooter’s genre convention of ruthlessly brutal American foreign intervention 
against a stateless terrorist other. 
In this moment the game presents a doubly enstranged experience. It reminds the interpreting-
subject of their otherness to the played-subject: the fact that they are controlling an avatar 
with a specific background story, visual representation and goals. And it reminds the 
interpreting-subject of their otherness to the playing-subject: that the choices taken are finite 
and pre-programmed according to the developer as co-speaking subject. Both of these, I 
argue, are taken for granted in moment-to-moment digital play. Such an astonishment – 
particularly within the concatenation of Spec Ops’ more subtle enstrangements from violent 
games’ conventions – may serve to remind the player of the material reality of these 
situations. These more subtle enstrangements aim to remind the player similarly of his split 
subjectivity: literal reflections in mirrors or liquids; requests by other characters to quit the 
game; the loading screen asking you how many soldiers you have killed. 
In a complete formulation: by disrupting the identification of Spec Ops’ stable embodied 
presence, the effect of enstrangement allows the interpreting-subject of the player to 
distantiate itself in a critical attitude that allows a recognition of the depicted rule-governed 
activities of the playing-subject under the ludic contract. More colloquially, in my case I was 
reminded that I had effortlessly identified with Cpt. Walker – certainly not the first Western 
soldier-avatar that I had controlled in the process of killing thousands of stateless (or even 
outer-space alien) terrorist actors. I had suspended the split between myself behind the 
computer, my actions within the game and the character whose role I was partly enacting 
(Error! Reference source not found.). By disrupting my identification – showing both the 
otherness of my avatar and my own act of playing – the game reminded me of this split, the 
                                                 
12
 One might, perhaps ironically, state that the anti-glare technology increasingly present in modern-day monitors 
is a great hinderance to the potential for the video game medium as a potent site for meaning creation. 
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quasi-natural conventional nature of the situation and its likeness to white phosphorus attacks 
such as those in Fallujah. 
As Brendan Keogh notes in his excellent close-reading of Spec Ops, “there is a loading screen 
tip towards the end of the game, when Walker’s cognitive dissonance is nearing its most 
extreme” (2012, 3): “to kill for yourself is murder, to kill for your government is heroic, to 
kill for entertainment is harmless” (Yager Development, 2012). Here, Walker turns out to kill 
for himself: Konrad turns out to be a figment, the orders were long revoked. The playing-
subject, however, kills for the government of the game, conducted as a subject to act under the 








Killing for Entertainment 
How harmless is it to kill for entertainment? The subjecthood proposed by Spec Ops’ stylized 
simulation demands a playing-subject that kills by demand, while simultaneously criticizing 
this demand for the interpreting player. In the final section of this paper, I will adopt the 
function of enstrangement in Bertolt Brecht’s major pedagogy to argue that Spec Ops 
destabilization of the unity of players’ subjecthood frustrates identification.  
I will first introduce Brecht’s project as a ‘new’ type of theatre, focusing specifically on 
Brecht’s Lehrstücke – didactical plays that are a type of participatory theatre. Second, I will 
relate the disruption of actor-audiences’ identification with their enacted roles to the critical 
potential therein. Finally, I will reconnect this spect-actorial enstrangement to digital game-
play by the example of Spec Ops. 
Bertolt Brecht is well-known as an influential proponent of the epic theatre – along with such 
contemporaries as Max Reinhardt and Erwin Piscator (Gray 1961: 61). Epic theatre can be 
understood as a type of dialectical theatre in a Marxist sense – i.e. that the interaction or even 
intermingling between actors and audiences leads to a critical questioning of the material 
conditions presented in the play. Brecht’s friend and accompanying theorist Walter Benjamin 
identifies “the general educational approach of Marxism [as one] determined by the dialectic 
at work between the attitude of teaching and that of learning,” which in the practice of epic 
theatre translates to “the constant dialectic between the action which is shown on the stage 
and the attitude of showing an action on the stage” (1966: 11). Evidently, then, Brecht and 
Interpreting subject Playing subject Played subject 
“Interpreting subject” (v. Alphen) “Speaking subject” (v. Alphen) “Interpreted subject”  (v. Alphen) 
Deconstructive, ludoliterate  Created in a power structure under 
a ludic contract 
Fictional, represented content of 
the game 
(e.g.) Lars de Wildt Dual-locus configuration Cpt. Martin Walker 
 Figure 2. The Player Subject:  interpreting, playing, played   
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others try to teach the audience something, principally their “capacity for action” (Brecht 
1964: 37), specifically on such topics as “oil, inflation, war, social struggles, the family, 
religion, wheat, the meat market” and so on (71).  
Importantly, this dialectical nature of the theatre is made possible by a specific type of 
engagement with the play: it necessitates a certain critical distance. That is to say, the 
audience cannot blindly identify or empathize with a protagonist, but must remain critically 
distant. Instead of “identifying itself with the hero,” Benjamin argues, the audience of epic 
theatre “is called upon to learn to be astonished at the circumstances within which he has his 
being” (1939: 19). It is this astonishment (Staunen) that is the basis for understanding that one 
can change social conditions, that other worlds are indeed possible. Elsewhere, Benjamin 
identifies the distance created as not merely “detrimental to illusion” but “meant to make the 
audience adopt a critical attitude, to make it think” (1938: 38).  
This disidentification or erasure of empathy I have above termed ‘enstrangement:’ in the case 
of Spec Ops, I indicated an enstrangement – a making strange or unfamiliar – from the genre 
convention of ruthlessly brutal American foreign intervention against a stateless terrorist 
other. Throughout Brecht’s oeuvre, techniques of breaking the fourth wall and a ‘radical 
separation of the elements’ (Trennung der Elemente) serve to enstrange the audience from the 
play by stressing the artificiality of it. These techniques are part of Brecht’s minor pedagogy: 
a “means of empowering the [passive] audience in its engagement with conventional 
bourgeois theatre repertoire” (Calico 2008: 141). Rather than a comparison of Brecht’s minor 
pedagogy to digital games,
13
 I am more interested in his major pedagogy as presented through 
his Lehrstücke. As opposed to minor pedagogy’s traditionally passive audience, major 
pedagogy is an “instigation of literal political activism via the theater event” that “transforms 
the spectator into a spect-actor, a subject with agency that extends well beyond the theater” 
(ibid.).  
I intend to focus on the role of actor-character identification in Brecht’s specific genre of 
major pedagogical theatre: the Lehrstück. Constituting a separate genre of Brecht’s plays, the 
Lehrstücke are didactic plays intended to learn through acting. I again favour Benjamin’s 
lucid and concise description: whilst the epic theatre is always intended “for the actors quite 
as much as for the spectators,” the Lehrstück “falls into a category of its own [in that] it 
facilitates and encourages the interchangeability of actors and audience, audience and actors” 
(1939: 20). In the case of one play regarding Charles Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight, Brecht 
emphasizes the importance of participation. Whilst “the figure of a public hero in Der Flug 
der Lindberghs might be used to induce the listener at a concert to identify himself with the 
hero,” the rewritten version as a Lehrstück prevents the listener from “cut[ting] himself off 
from the masses” (1964: 32, original emphasis). Rather, “the Flier’s part must be sung by a 
chorus” in order to “save something of the paedagogical effect,” (ibid. original emphasis) 
which was to criticize the glorification of the event and its hero, instead reflecting on the 
conditions of the relevant workers (Benjamin 1939: 20). 
                                                 
13
 A wonderfully educative introductory account of which is presented in Lies van Roessel’s MA-Thesis 
Restaging the Epic (2008). 
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A specific example that sheds light on the role of identification in the Lehrstücke is Die 
Maßnahme (Brecht 1930). While it lacks the branching narrative of the dual Der Jasager/Der 
Neinsager Lehrstücke (Brecht 1929; 1930), and has been performed in front of a public, it 
presents a fundamental enstrangement, not just for the audience but for the actors regarding 
their roles. As Yasco Horsman notes: “[the] alienation effect is enhanced by the fact that the 
four comrades take turns playing the young comrade,” rotating and re-announcing each role 
they take up;  
…the roles played on stage are not to be understood as characters with 
psychological depth; they are merely functions, demonstrations of certain types 
so that […] the actors do not themselves fall into the trap of identification. 
(Horsman 2011: 102-03) 
Essentially, the actors are made to be continually enstranged, disidentified from the roles they 
play. Much in the same way that a player might see their avatars taken over by the actor of a 
cut-scene, losing their presence in third-person configurations. Thus, interpreting-subjects are 
enstranged when game-play reminds them of the uneasy fit or discrepancy between the 
playing-subject of the game and the subjective natural presence of ourselves as interpreters 
outside of the game. 
The critical potential of this discrepancy between an interpreting-subject and their playing-
subject – the person of the actor and their acted role – is that it may allow an enstrangement 
from familiar situations through an arousal of “astonishment rather than empathy” (Benjamin 
1939: 18). That is to say: by being confronted with familiar things from enstranged 
perspectives, one’s astonishment with them is supposedly renewed. In that way, 
enstrangement may provoke a critical re-engagement with ideological conventions that are 
regularly taken for granted as natural. 
Concretely, in the case of Spec Ops, the thematized reflection enacted by the played character 
Walker, his team mates and the auctorial narrator of the loading screen enforce a disrupted 
identification of the interpreting-subject with their in-game performance. The effect, as 
discussed, has a critical potential: it serves to remind the interpreting-subject of the 
unabashedly cruel actions taken for granted as enacted by the power structure of the game’s 
affordances and constraints. Retroactively, I argue that it serves as a means to reflect on 
previous violent deeds performed by convention, hence without hesitation or critical 
reflection. Keogh reminds his readers of Gears of War’s “cover system evoking the intensity 
and claustrophobia of an utterly futile war” leading the player to act violently “even as the 
games laughably ask us to weep for a character’s dead wife moments after he trash-talked an 
enemy while stomping on his brains” (Keogh, 2012, 2). Such performances are demanded in 
these games: stomping on brains is an affordance that the game offers to most efficiently kill a 
nearby enemy, while its constraints insist on taking this enemy out in the first place in order to 
progress. 
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Conclusion: on the Subject of Play 
I have schematized the player as indeed, in part, a playing-subject following games’ 
governing structures under a ludic contract or attitude. Simultaneously, players have 
knowledge and desires outside of this structure, on the basis of which I argued for the 
recognition of an interpreting-subject in the player. This interpreting-subject, as a ludoliterate 
interpreter of the game, first of all informs play in that it interprets the presented presented 
structures according to digital game conventions. On the other hand, the interpreting-subject 
is important to acknowledge in order not to fall back into an interpellational argument. One 
can play along with the structure offered by a game, but the player is always more than what 
he is doing within the game. The ‘played’ subject, finally, is at once the subject of the game 
(its presented content, themes and narratives) as well as the controlled character or avatar that 
is part of that content. While the interpreting-subject may inform and witness the playing-
subject, who is present through the played-subject, these are inherently separate. The played-
subject Captain Martin Walker has a face, a story, a gender and other properties that the other 
subjects outside of the possible world need not necessarily have. 
With this knowledge, I can further refine my answer to the research question at hand. The 
type of ideological subject constructed through digital game-play is:  
1. a split subject divided across an interpreting-subject akin to the deconstructive 
subjectivity of Raessens or Friedman;  
2. who assumes a temporary subjectivity created by the game through a 
voluntarily assumed playing-subject position shaped by the game as a power 
structure akin to the interpellated subjectivity of Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter;  
3. and a represented subject which is a played-subject controlled by this playing-
subject. 
In light of this split subjectivity, I argued that Spec Ops: the Line allows the player to enact a 
double enstrangement between the subjects of play. It does so by creating a ludonarrative 
dissonance – a difference between what its narrative component relates and what the ludic 
power structure affords and constrains the player to do. Firstly, it enstranges the playing-
subject from the played-subject by demanding certain actions – killing ruthlessly without 
question, most notably through the use of white phosphorus – while at the same time 
indicating the inhumanity of this action. The concrete played-subject of Walker, the character 
controlled by the player, goes insane: what started out as a rescue mission becomes a 
delusional, selfish and unethical narrative – one driven forward by the playing-subject’s 
progression.  
Meanwhile, the played-subject of the game addresses the dangers of unquestioned loyalty by 
portraying the means by which it is enacted as cruel. After killing hundreds of soldiers, or 
walking through a battlefield of half-dead soldiers still gasping for breath, the player will 
often encounter loading screens with written messages – on a level of narration – confronting 
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the interpreting-subject with their actions as a playing-subject: “How many Americans have 
you killed today?” 
This double enstrangement – of the playing-subject to the played-subject and the interpreting-
subject to the playing-subject – works because it depends on a knowledge of conventions. 
Past repeating the conventions of traditional shooter games, however, Spec Ops subverts 
them. The affordances, constraints and desires offered to the playing-subject are structurally 
put into question. In the cynical words of the loading screen, the game asks: “Do you feel like 
a hero yet”? 
That these conventions are otherwise habitually left unquestioned – as in many of the generic 
titles named above – is what grants Spec Ops’ reflection a critical potential. By comparison to 
Brecht’s major pedagogy, I argued that the enstrangement of a spect-actor – an audience that 
actively takes part in a didactic play or Lehrstück – may lead to a reflection on the world 
outside of the play. By frustrating the uncritical identification of a spect-actor with their 
enacted role, spect-actors – and players alike – are able to re-cognize (to learn or know again) 
the familiar, ideological conventions within and beyond that instance of the (game-)play. 
Hence, an uneasy fit between the playing- and played-subject (or ludonarrative dissonance); 
and an uneasy identification between the interpreting- and playing-subject causes the 
enstrangement necessary for game-play to challenge ideologies; and for the player to reach 
renewed insights into the material conditions and social relations of lived society. In that way, 
material conditions and social injustices that are regularly taken for granted as quasi-natural, 
ideological conventions can appear once again as they are: unfair, unjust or cruel. 
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Ludography 
AMERICA’S ARMY. United States Army, PC (Microsoft Windows), 2002. 
BIOSHOCK. 2K Games, PC (Microsoft Windows), 2007. 
CALL OF DUTY: MODERN WARFARE 2. Infinity Ward, Activision, PlayStation 3, 2009. 
CUSTER’S REVENGE. Mystique, Atari 2600, 1982. 
THE STANLEY PARABLE. Galactic Café, Steam, PC (Microsoft Windows), 2013. 
GEARS OF WAR. Epic Games, Microsoft Game Studios, Xbox 360, 2006. 
UNCHARTED: DRAKE’S FORTUNE. Naughty Dog and SCE Bend Studio, Sony Computer 
Entertainment, PlayStation 3, 2007. 
SPEC OPS: THE LINE. Yager Development, 2K Games, PlayStation 3, 2012. 
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